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Abstract
This paper investigates contagion e®ects. In a model with highly and
lowly informed investors we show that a currency crisis in one country can
trigger a crisis in another country. Portfolio losses of the highly informed
investors in one country will force them to withdraw capital from the
other country. The behavior of the lowly informed investors multiplies
this e®ect and the other country becomes more and more vulnerable.
In the empirical part we focus on the Asian crisis (1997/98). Using a
LOGIT approach we can show that contagion, in the sense of a crisis
not explainable by economic fundamentals but by exchange rate losses
resulting from investment in other countries, seems to have caused the
currency crises of the Philippines and especially of Singapore.
Keywords: Contagion, Currency crises, Asian crisis
JEL Classi¯cation: F3, F4
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11 Introduction
The ¯nancial crises of the last decade suggest that there might be some conta-
gion e®ects transmitting a crisis from one country to another. The Asian crisis
in 1997/98 is often mentioned in this context. For some countries, e.g. Thai-
land, there were enough bad fundamentals to justify a crisis but for others, e.g.
Singapore, there was not very much that indicated the arising crisis.
In recent literature, there is some common understanding that regional spillover
e®ects played a signi¯cant role in the Asian crisis and allow to explain partially
why, within a short period of time, many neighboring economies su®ered from
crises which originated in Thailand. But there is also common belief that fun-
damentals cannot explain the whole story and that capital redirections initiated
by highly exposed international lenders may have caused crises even in countries
with an otherwise relatively sound economic environment.
In the presence of high exposure of foreign investors, adopting Calvo's (1999)
trigger mechanism, contagion may be the result of di®erent information levels
of investors: if informed investors redirect their overall investment due to cap-
ital losses in a market which is already collapsed, by mimicking disinvesting
behavior, the uninformed may cause crises in other markets. We identify this
development as contagion. This is in line with the de¯nition of contagion given
by Masson (1998): expectations change without fundamental reasons.
It is the aim of our paper to rationalize this contagion behavior and to analyze
empirically the role of contagion in the Asian crisis. Section 2 derives a theo-
retical foundation. A model of two emerging markets will be developed and it
will be shown under which conditions portfolio losses in one country caused by
an exchange rate crisis can trigger a currency crisis in the other country.
Given our theoretical reasoning, an empirical investigation should show that
exchange rate losses in some countries can be taken as an indicator for conta-
gion which add in explaining currency crises in other countries. In section 3,
we present the empirical investigation. Using a LOGIT-model we introduce a
contagion indicator and ¯nd clear signs that contagion has played a major role
for at least two countries considered: Singapore and the Philippines.
2 Theoretical reasoning
The above de¯nition of contagion is that the expectations change without fun-
damental reasons. The crucial question is: What are the mechanisms that
transmit a ¯nancial crisis from one country to another one without any funda-
mental reasons?
Recent theoretical work gives some answers to this question. One refers to the
possibility of multiple equilibria in an economy.1 As far as no one knows which
equilibrium would be selected under 'normal' conditions, a crisis in another
country could easily be a 'sunspot' for a 'bad' equilibrium.2
A di®erent idea is that contagion might have political reasons. Drazen (1998,
p. 1) argues that "...when one of a country's principal objectives in maintain-
ing a ¯xed exchange rate is (explicit or implicit) political integration with its
1An often cited framework for multiple equilibria and currency crises is given by Obstfeld
(1994).
2See e.g. Masson (1998) or Mullainathan (1998)
2'neighbors', a devaluation by one of those neighbors will increase speculative
pressures on the country. This argument is especially relevant to the EMS, but
is not limited to it."
A possible third reason for contagion is shown by Calvo (1999). He develops
a model of two di®erent kinds of agents investing in an emerging market. On
one side there are informed investors which know the fundamentals behind the
distribution of the returns in the emerging market. On the other side there
are uninformed investors which only can observe the actions of the informed
investors.
If the actions of the informed investors are motivated not only by the expected
returns but also by facts that are relevant for them only, the uninformed in-
vestors make their decisions in accordance with these possibly misleading sig-
nals. Calvo mentions the example that the informed investors might face liquid-
ity problems resulting from another market (e.g. Wall Street). As a consequence
these investors are forced to withdraw capital from the emerging market. Calvo
shows that it is rational for the uninformed investors to take this action as a
bad signal for the expected returns. The uninformed investors then will also
withdraw capital from the emerging market, and the liquidity e®ect is multi-
plied. This might trigger a crises.
Our approach is in line with this idea. Section 2.1 presents a model of two types
of investors: an investor with a high information level who is living in an emerg-
ing market (subsection 2.1.1) and reacts on expected returns and an investor
with a low information level who is living in an industrial country (subsection
2.1.2) and reacts very mechanically on changes in prices.
In section 2.2 it is shown how the di®erent agents react on a crash in one coun-
try and under which conditions these reactions can trigger a crisis in another
country.
2.1 The Model
There are two emerging countries i and j. It is assumed that the government of
each country tries to ¯x its exchange rate 1:1 to the currency of a third country
by market interventions.3 The timescale is discrete. In period t the two gov-
ernments have the foreign exchange reserves Ri
t ¸ 0 and R
j
t ¸ 0, respectively.
If a country's reserves are exhausted there is a sudden end of the peg and the
exchange rate begins to °oat freely for ever. This is what we call a "crash".
In each emerging country there is one risky asset which is supplied totally in-




t , respectively. The maturity date of both assets is period T. It is
assumed that the return depends on weather the corresponding exchange rate
peg prevails or not.4 For simplicity we assume that the value of an asset in T
is 1 if the corresponding exchange rate remains ¯xed in period T and it is 0 if
there is or was a crash.5
There are two safe assets which are supplied totally elastic at constant prices.
3In the case of the Asian crises this third country would be the US.
4These assets could be interpreted as state bonds that are paid in a foreign currency, say
US dollar. If the exchange rate drops the government might have di±culties to ful¯ll its
liabilities. Another example might be shares of local enterprises that have borrowed in US
dollar. If the dollar becomes more expensive the enterprises might become bankrupt.
5Since in each country there is a 1:1 peg to the currency of the third country, it does not
matter if these values are denominated in the local or in the foreign currency.
3One traded in the currency of country i and one traded in the currency of the
third country.6 For simplicity we assume that both assets have zero interest
rate.
There are two di®erent types of investors: one with a high information level and
one with only limited information about the fundamentals of the two emerging
countries. A good reason for the existence of both highly and lowly informed
investors can be seen in the costs linked with the production of information.
Calvo (1999, p.3) writes:
"Fixed costs generate economies of scale and, hence, the ¯nancial
industry is likely to organize itself around clusters of specialists. This
makes it plausible to assume that there exists a set of informed and
a set of uninformed investors."
The highly informed investor lives in country i. He is interested in the utility
from his wealth denominated in the currency of country i and invests his wealth
in the assets i and j and the residual in the safe asset of country i.7 The lowly
informed investor lives in the third country. He is interested in the utility from
his wealth denominated in the currency of his home country and invests his
wealth only in the asset i and the residual in the safe asset of the third country.
The contagion mechanism formalized in section 2.2 can be described as follows:
A crises in country j leads to losses for the highly informed investor from
country i. These losses may induce him to reduce the absolute amount invested
in asset i. This would lead to a falling price of asset i.
The investor with limited information will interpret this as a bad signal for the
return of asset i. As a consequence he will withdraw capital from this asset
and, hence, from the country i. The withdrawals of the foreign investor can
lead to a crises in country i, too.
Before we derive the necessary conditions for contagion we have to formalize
the behavior of the two investors and to analyze how the prices and the reserves
are driven by this behavior.
2.1.1 The Highly Informed Investor
Information is costly for any investor, private knowledge is limited, and nobody
could know everything. As a result it might be rational for an informed investor
to concentrate his attention on a limited set of markets. This subsection de-
scribes the behavior of a highly informed investor (h) who lives in country i and
concentrates himself on the two risky assets in his region: the assets i and j. At
any time t prior T, the highly informed investor infer from his set of information
on the ability of the respective country to ¯x its currency how likely repayment




t, respectively. We assume that there is no information to
the informed investor that the governments might ¯nance future budget de¯cits
by reserves. Similarly, the informed investor does not expect other investors to
change their behavior. Hence, he expects prices and foreign exchange reserves
6Such an asset is, of course, safe only for an investor whose goal function depends on his
wealth denominated in the corresponding currency.
7Therefore, country i could be interpreted as a regional ¯nancial center. In the case of the
Asian crises this country may be Hong Kong or Singapore.
4to remain unchanged before T. Especially, the investor h infer the non-crash















¼0(Rt) > 0 ¼(0) = 0 ¼(1) = 1 (1)
These probabilities are uncorrelated. The reader should have in mind that these
probabilities ¼t di®er from the probabilities ¼t;¿ that there is no crash in at ¿
prior to T because T is the maturity date of the two assets. If the value of
the assets paid to foreigners is larger than the remaining reserves, the existence
of the exchange-rate regime depends on the ability of the country to issue new
assets in T.
The investor h invests his wealth (W h
t ) in three assets to maximize the expected
utility from his wealth in period T denominated in the currency of his home
country: He invests the fraction fi
t of his wealth in asset i, the fraction f
j
t in
asset j, and the residual (1 ¡ fi
t ¡ f
j
t ) in the safe asset from his home country



























It is further assumed that he has constant relative risk aversion, say a loga-














T is given by equation (2) where P i
T is 1 with probability ¼i
T¡1 and 0 with
probability 1 ¡ ¼i
T¡1. The corresponding applies for P
j
T. The ¯rst order condi-



















































































8Under constant relative risk aversion, the fractions fi
t and f
j
t are independent of the
amount invested. Therefore, for a given W h
t , prices and fractions do not depend on the








































































































Given prices and non-crash probabilities at T ¡ 1, using backward induction,






























T ¡ 2 T ¡ 1 T
RT¡2 RT¡1 = RT¡2 no crash
R0
































T¡1) 1 ¡ ¼(RT¡2)
Figure 1: Transition probabilities for the decision of investor h in T ¡ 2.
Since the investor h does not expect changes of the reserves before T he neither
expects changes in the probability of a crash in T, nor changes in prices, nor a
crash before T. Hence, the prices in T ¡ 1 are predetermined and there is no
uncertainty about the next period. The ¯rst order conditions for an optimal


































































¶ = 0 (8)
Hence, the investor h invests in the two risky assets until their prices in T ¡ 2




T¡2 the investor h plans to invest at T ¡2 are the same as they are ex ante at
T ¡ 1. The same applies for all periods t < T ¡ 1. Therefore, substituting the
investment fractions from equation (4) and (5), the ¯rst order conditions for an































































































































































where the index t of the parameters ¼ represents the knowledge in period t
about the foreign exchange reserves in T ¡1. Since the investor does not expect
a change of the foreign exchange reserves, he expect them to be equal to Rt.
2.1.2 The Lowly Informed Investor
This subsection describes the behavior of a lowly informed investor (l) who lives
in the third country. We assume that he invests only in the emerging market i
and follows a simple rule: He buys the winners and sells the losers.9
The investor from the third country maximizes the expected utility from his
wealth in period T denominated in his local currency. It is assumed that he
has the same log-utility function as the investor h. At t he has the wealth W l
t,
invests the fraction fl
t in the risky asset of country i and the residual (1 ¡ fl
t)
in the save asset of his home country (the third country). Therefore, his wealth
evolves in the following way:















The investor l knows nothing about the fundamentals, he only observes the
development of the asset prices.10 He estimates the non-crash probability for
country i, ^ ¼t(Pi
t¡1; ^ ¼t¡1), by using public information P i
t¡1 and adapting his
prior probability ^ ¼t¡1. We assume that ^ ¼t depends positively on both para-
meters and that ^ ¼t = ^ ¼t¡1 if P i
t¡1 = P i
t¡2. In T ¡ 1 his maximization problem
is:
maxE[ln(W l






























^ ¼T¡1 ¡ P i
T¡1
1 ¡ P i
T¡1
(13)
Since the investor l also does not expect changes of his information set, i.e. the
prices, in period T ¡ 2 he invests ex ante the same fraction of his wealth in the
risky asset i as in T ¡ 1. The same holds for all periods t < T ¡ 1. Hence, the








^ ¼t ¡ P i
t
1 ¡ P i
t
(14)
2.1.3 The Asset Prices
The supply of the two risky assets is totally inelastic. For simplicity, we assume
that, for both assets, the respective volume issued is 1. Hence, the asset price
is equal to the value of the entire volume of the issue. The market-clearing
conditions require that the value of each asset equals the value of the entire














In both equations, the exchange rates do not matter because in each country




t(0) = 0, respectively.
10As shown by Calvo (1999), it is rational for uninformed investors to take signals emitted
by the informed investors as a good indicator for the development of the fundamentals.
82.1.4 The Foreign Exchange Reserves
There are net capital out°ows from a country if a foreign investor sells domestic
assets to a domestic investor and invests the capital abroad. In our model this
could happen in country i, only. The investor from the third country can sell
some of his assets from country i to the investor living in country i and invest
the received capital in the safe asset of his home country.




and in t¡1 by fl
t¡1Wl
t¡1=Pi
t¡1. Therefore, the volume of the asset i he buys in













The value of this purchase, denominated in currency of country i, is identical
















In order to ¯x the exchange rate, the government has to compensate for these
net capital imports. It will accumulate reserves when they are positive and
disinvest reserves when there are capital out°ows. The reserves of country i



















In our model there are no net capital in- or out°ows for country j. But we
assume that its government might face a budget de¯cit (D
j
t), to be ¯nanced by








As assumed in the beginning the investing agents do not expect budget de¯cits
to occur. Therefore, they do not expect changes of the foreign exchange
reserves and a crash to happen in country j before T.
2.2 The Crash
This section investigates the e®ects of a "crash" in emerging market j. As
shown by Krugman (1979) and Flood and Garber (1984) a government which
implements a policy that is not consistent with a peg of the exchange rate, will
gradually lose reserves.12 This development will end in a crash. Krugman (1979,
p.319) writes:
11Krugman (1979) and Flood and Garber (1984) show in which way budget de¯cits lead to
declining exchange reserves.
12A policy that is not consistent with the policy of ¯xing the exchange rate is for example a
budget de¯cit ¯nanced by issuing money. This example is also mentioned by Krugman (1979)
and Flood and Garber (1984).
9"There comes a point when the problem becomes a 'crisis': specula-
tors, anticipating an abandonment of the ¯xed exchange rate, seek
to acquire the government's reserves of foreign money. This crisis
always comes before the government would have run out of reserves
in the absence of speculation."
It is now assumed that there is this kind of crash in country j in period ¿ <
T ¡1 caused by excessive exhaustion of exchange rate reserves, say for ¯nancing
de¯cits. This means that country j's government may be seen as self responsible
for the crash in its own country. Furthermore, we assume that the prices of the
two risky assets were unchanged until period ¿ ¡ 1. To see what happens to
country i after that crash, the reactions of the highly and the lowly informed
investor have to be analysed.
2.2.1 The Crash in Country j at Period ¿
According to equation (17), after the crash in country j, expected utility of
holding asset j is zero. One can easily show that now the optimal investment
fraction fj
¿ and the price P j




































Hence, the investor h loses everything he has invested in the risky asset of
country j. This loss is equal to the price of the asset in period ¿ ¡ 1.
The following examines in which way the crash in country j a®ects the asset
price and the reserves in country i.
2.2.2 Country i in Period ¿
In period ¿ the investor h invests only in the risky asset i and in the save asset
of his home country. Therefore, his optimal investment fraction in ¿ can be




¿ ¡ P i
¿
1 ¡ P i
¿
(21)









































In the following we write P i
¿ = ¯¿Pi





















From replacing the fractions fi
¿ and fl



































¿¡1 + ^ ¼¿(1 ¡ fl
¿¡1)Wl
¿¡1 (25)
We want to analyze whether if the price of asset i rises, falls or remains un-
changed in period ¿.
< price falls
¯¿ = 1 no e®ect (26)
> price rises
If the price in ¿ is lower than in ¿ ¡ 1, the crash in country j leads to a price
reduction in country i. This may lead to contagion. If the prices are equal
there is no e®ect and if it is higher than in ¿ ¡1 there is some kind of 'negative
contagion'.










































¿ ¡ P i
¿¡1






^ ¼¿ ¡ P i
¿¡1




Following section 2.1.2 investor l only changes his inferred non-crash probability
^ ¼¿ if the price of asset i has changed in the last period. Since we have assumed
that prices remain unchanged until period ¿ ¡ 1 the likelihood ^ ¼¿ is equal to
^ ¼¿¡1. Hence, the coe±cient of W l
¿¡1 in equation (28) is equal to the fraction
fl





¿ ¡ P i
¿¡1









¿ ¡ P i
¿¡1





The fraction on the right hand side of condition (30) corresponds with the
fraction fi
¿. Since this fraction depends negatively on the price, the condition





> (1 ¡ f
j
¿¡1) (31)
11Hence, condition (31) is equivalent to stating that the crash in country j leads
to a lower price in country i. And (31) holds if the portfolio reaction on the
crash in j is not too intense (left hand side) and if the losses from the crash in
country j were very large (right hand side). The fact that the investor h loses
the possibility to diversify his portfolio favors the ¯rst argument. Hence, he will
reduce the total fraction of his wealth he has invested in the risky assets if the
price and reserves do not change. The second argument seems quite plausible:
in the 1997 crisis in Thailand the Dollar price in baht mounted at a rate of over
100 percent. Hence, portfolio losses were very high.
From a portfolio-theoretical approach, exchange rate losses should be a valid
indicator for contagion. This argument will be veri¯ed by our empirical inves-
tigation in section 3.
In the following we assume that the condition (31) is ful¯lled, hence, the price
of the asset in country i falls (0 < ¯¿ < 1). In ¿ the foreign exchange reserves
















































1 ¡ ^ ¼¿¡1
1 ¡ P i
¿¡1
> ¯¿
^ ¼¿¡1 ¡ P i
¿¡1
1 ¡ P i
¿¡1




Following subsection 2.1.2 ^ ¼¿ only changes if the price in ¿¡1 was di®erent from
the price in ¿ ¡2. But as assumed above the prices were unchanged until period
¿ ¡ 1. Therefore the condition (34) holds because by our assumption, ¯ < 1,
and the reserves increase from ¿ ¡1 to ¿. This increase is no surprise since in ¿
the price only falls if the investor h sells the asset to the foreign investor l, and
this raises the foreign exchange reserves of country i.
2.2.3 Country i in period ¿ + 1
The investor l can observe the reaction of the investor h indirectly by looking
at the changes of the asset price. As mentioned in section 2.1.2, he computes
his probability estimation ^ ¼¿ from the development of the price. As assumed in
the last subsection, the price of the asset in country i falls, hence the investor l
reduces his own probability. This leads to a further drop of the price P i in ¿ +1.
We will next show that in ¿ + 1 this drop induces a drop of foreign exchange
reserves.




































The left side of this inequation is the net value of the assets the foreign investor
l buys from the domestic investor h. This value must be equal to the net value





















¿+1 ¡ P i
¿+1









¿ ¡ P i
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¿+1 ¡ P i
¿+1)(1 ¡ ¼i
¿) > P i
¿+1(¼i














¿+1) > 0 (36)
If this condition is ful¯lled, the foreign exchange reserves fall in ¿ + 1. It
is easy to see that g0 > 0. Moreover, at ¼i
¿ holds g(¼i
¿) > 0, if and only if
Pi
¿ ¡ P i
¿+1 > 0, and the latter relation holds.
Now, from P i
¿+1 < P i
¿ follows g(¼i
¿+1) > 0, i.e. condition (36) is ful¯lled.
Suppose to the contrary that g(¼i
¿+1) · 0. Then the reserves do not fall in
¿ + 1 (Ri
¿+1 ¸ Ri
¿). Hence, following (1) this leads to ¼i
¿+1 ¸ ¼i
¿. As g0 > 0,
g(¼i
¿) ¸ g(¼i
¿+1) > 0 which is a contradiction.
Therefore , the foreign exchange reserves decline if the price of asset i falls in
¿ + 1, which is ful¯lled because the investor l reduces his non-crash probability
in ¿ + 1.
Our result shown so far is no surprise. The foreign investor l, misled by the
price signal from the previous period, sells some of his assets to the domestic
investor h. This leads to declining prices and falling reserves in country i. The
latter reduces the non-crash probability and thereby enforces the drop of the
asset price.
In the next period the foreign investor will then interpret this as a further bad
signal for the returns of the asset. This process recurs in the next periods.
132.2.4 Contagion
As shown in section 2.2.2 the crash in country j could lead to a reduction of
the asset price in country i if the domestic investor sells the asset to the foreign
investor. Following equation (32) this implies a rise in the foreign exchange
reserves in country i and, following (1), in the probability ¼i
¿ which is a good
signal for the non-crash likelihood at period T. But this does not stimulate the
demand of the lowly informed foreign investor to buy asset i because he only
follows price signals from the past, and prices remained constant till ¿ ¡ 1.
In the next period the reduction of the asset price will be interpreted by the
foreign investor as a bad signal for the asset return. This will lead to a further
reduction of the asset price but this time the foreign investor sells the asset to
the domestic investor. Following subsection 2.2.3 this implies also a decline of
the foreign exchange reserves of country i.
This process recurs in the next periods and leads to lower and lower foreign
exchange reserves in country i. As we can see from equation (17), these capital
out°ows can not exhaust the foreign exchange reserves totally. But the country
i gets more and more vulnerable to speculative attacks. There might be a spec-
ulative attack if the foreign exchange reserves fall under a critical value, which
leads to a crash in country i, too.
Summarizing, the crash in country j could trigger two price e®ects. The direct
e®ect derives from the reduction of the wealth of the highly informed investor
from country i who may be forced to withdraw capital from the asset i. The
indirect e®ect derives from the price signal that triggers some kind of herding
behavior of the lowly informed foreign investor. This multiplies the direct e®ect
on the asset price but also reduces the foreign exchange reserves of country i
and raises the likelihood of a speculative attack and a crash.
The increase of the crash probability of country i was triggered by the crash in
country j. This is what we identify as the case of contagion.
With regard to the Asian crisis in 1997 the country j, experiencing an unex-
pected and fundamental crisis, could be Thailand. Hence, capital out°ows are
not necessarily the origins of the crisis. The infected country i could be any
country whose fundamentals were not bad enough to justify a crisis, e.g. Sin-
gapore.13
Borensztein and Gelos (2000) examine the behavior of emerging market mutual
funds. They found that there were no sizeable capital out°ows from Thailand
before its crisis, out°ows even diminished. But looking at the whole Asian sam-
ple Borensztein and Gelos observed that the funds withdrew large sums and
there were net out°ows prior the crisis. The authors write (p. 11):
"To some extent, this is not surprising, since a withdrawal of in-
vestors is exactly what brings about a crisis."
This is in line with our results.
13See section 3.
143 Empirical Research
3.1 Aim of the investigation
The aim of this part is to ¯nd evidence for contagion e®ects in the case of the
Asian crisis. We will compute a contagion indicator that is able to indicate a
crisis which cannot be explained by the development of fundamental economic
indicators. This is in the line with the de¯nition of contagion given by Masson
(1998, p. 3)
"... a crisis in one country may conceivably trigger a crisis elsewhere
for reasons unexplained by macroeconomic fundamentals..."
In our approach the contagion indicator is a signal of considerable investment
losses in one currency which by itself causes high devaluation of another cur-
rency. A potential transmission mechanism thereby may be the mimicing be-
havior of less informed international investors, as explained above. Using a
LOGIT-Model we will show that though the major part of the Asian crisis can
be explained by bad fundamentals there are also cases of contagion where the
development of the fundamentals does not provide full explanation of the ob-
served crisis. In those cases, the implementation of a contagion indicator will
help to explain the crisis, and the estimation results will be improved.
3.2 De¯ning a Currency Crisis
An important step of the empirical investigation is to de¯ne a proper crisis
variable as the variable to be explained. In the literature, many di®erent meth-
ods are used. In general, the crisis variable is dichotomous and becomes 1 if
a currency crisis appears in the corresponding year (this means a prede¯ned
threshold value is exceeded) and 0 otherwise.14
The major di®erence among the various crisis de¯nitions is the design of the
respective dummy variable. Up to three indicators15 are used to de¯ne a crisis
event. Kaminsky, Lizondo and Reinhart (1998) for example introduce an "In-
dex of Exchange Market Pressure" built on the exchange rate and the foreign
exchange reserves.
Also the de¯nition of the threshold value is quite di®erent within literature.
While early approaches often use simple threshold values like a ¯xed percentage
rate for the currency devaluation16 recent studies often apply threshold values
based on the mean ¹ and the standard deviation ¾ of the past realization of the
respective variables.
Our crisis indicator re°ects solely the development of the nominal US-Dollar
exchange rate. A currency crisis is de¯ned as an intense and abrupt change in
the nominal exchange rate. Like Esquivel and Larrain (1998) we exclude un-
successful speculative attacks from our crisis de¯nition, hence, we depart from
foreign exchange reserves observation.
The corresponding threshold value is computed by using weighted values of the
country-speci¯c mean ¹i and the overall standard deviation ¾ as follows:
14For a notable exception see Eliasson and Kreuter (2001) using a continuous crisis variable.
15Exchange rate, foreign exchange reserves and interest rates, see e.g. Eichengreen, Rose
and Wyplosz (1994).

















t is the nominal US-Dollar exchange rate17 of country i in period t.
This de¯nition is similar to the de¯nitions used by e.g. Kaminsky and Reinhart
(1998). Kaminsky and Reinhart put more weight on the standard deviation
than we do. The reason is that Kaminsky and Reinhart employ "Early Warning
Systems" for currency crises where the speci¯c starting date of a crisis is much
more important. Our indicator produces a rather stable signal for the whole
crisis period, which is more applicable to our procedure to explain the occurrence
rather to forecast the beginning of crises. Since we want to investigate contagion
e®ects we decide to put more weight on the country-speci¯c ¹ such that the
crisis variable is in°uenced to a lower extend by ¾, the average deviations of all
countries in the sample.
Because of the dramatic devaluations during all crisis periods the pattern of the
crisis indicator is rather robust w.r.t. changes of the weights used to de¯ne this
variable.18 The ¯gures 2 to 7 show the annual growth rate of the nominal US-$
exchange rates for the relevant time span and the country-speci¯c threshold.
3.3 Regression Method
Since the dependent variable Crisisi
t is dichotomous and our data sample has a
time series and a cross section dimension it is reasonable to use a LOGIT model
for our estimation. This allows to deploy as much information from the sample
as possible.19
We suppose that there is an unobservable variable Crisisi¤







t is the vector of the independent variables of country i in period t,
¯ the vector of the coe±cients to be estimated and ²i
t the corresponding error
term.
We assume that the observed crisis indicator Crisisi







Then the corresponding LOGIT Model has the following form:
L(Crisisi
t) = ® + ¯Xi
t:
3.4 Data sample and explanatory variables
3.4.1 Data sample
Countries
As our study focuses on the East-Asian crisis our country sample contains
17Domestic currency per US-Dollar (IFS line RF).
18Our robustness result is in line with similar ¯ndings known in literature (see e.g. Frankel
and Rose(1996)).
19See Esquivel and Larrain (1998).
16only Asian countries. Taiwan, Hong-Kong and China were left out because of
missing data. Furthermore, Japan was excluded because, following our crisis
de¯nition, there was no crisis within the respective time span.
Hence, the sample consists of six Asian countries: Singapore, Korea, Malaysia,
Indonesia, Thailand and the Philippines. All these countries were hit by the
Asian crisis in 1997/98.
Explanatory Variables
To examine contagion e®ects, the beginning and the duration of each crisis
are decisive factors. The use of yearly data would lead to a loss of important
information: regardless whether the crisis starts in January or December, by
using yearly data the crisis always starts in the same year. Given the rather
narrow period of crisis events any attempt to use annual data in modelling
contagion was misleading. Thus we decided to use indicators available on a
monthly base. The advantage of using monthly data is illustrated by ¯gures
2 to 7. While the crisis in Thailand started in August 1997, the crises in the
other countries started between October and December 1997. Using yearly
data would concentrate all events to be analyzed on the same point in time.
Despite the fact that there are available data for a longer time horizon we
restricted the sample period to 1990 - 2000. One reason is that before 1990 there
were almost no crises in the Asian region. Another reason is that enlarging the
sample period would further reduce the ratio of crisis to non-crisis events below
a level of 10% and thus e®ect the explanatory power of the approach.
3.4.2 The Explanatory Variables
As mentioned above there are two restrictions for the data to enter the sample.
The variable must re°ect the development of the economic fundamentals and it
must be available on a monthly base.
This led to six variables we will discuss now in more detail:20
² Real Exchange Rate Index (-)
Flood and Garber (1984) develop the concept of a shadow exchange rate.
This is an exchange rate which would be realized without interventions
by the government. Flood and Garber show that at least if the shadow
exchange rate falls below the nominal exchange rate a speculative run on
the currency will occur.
Assuming that the real exchange rate index is a good indicator for the
shadow exchange rate, a decline of this variable will provide a higher
incentive to speculate against the currency.
Therefore we expect a negative relationship between the real exchange
rate index and the probability of a currency crisis.
{ DJPMREXi
t = growth rate of the JPMorgan real broad e®ective
exchange rate index
20The sign of the regression coe±cient expected from theoretical reasoning is given in brack-
ets following the respective variable. All variables except JPMorgan Real Exchange Rate Index









t is the JPMorgan real broad e®ective exchange rate
index.21
² M2 Multiplier (+)
The transmission of a banking crisis to a currency crisis is often mentioned
in the theoretical literature, see e.g. Krugman (1998) or Flood and Mar-
ion (2000). A growing money multiplier can be interpreted as a sign for
¯nancial liberalization accompanied by declining minimum reserves held
at the central bank. In countries with insu±cient banking supervision this
may lead to higher vulnerability of the banking sector.
Therefore we expect a positive relation.
{ M2MULTIi











t = Money (IFS line 34)
RMONEY i
t = Base Money (IFS line 14)
QMONEY i
t = Quasi Money (IFS line 35).
² Foreign Exchange Reserves (-)
The amount of foreign exchange reserves plays an important role if the
government wants to in°uence the exchange rate by intervening on the
foreign exchange market. In an extrem example the government may try to
peg the currency to e.g. the US-Dollar. Then a decline in foreign exchange
reserves reduces the government¶s ability to maintain the exchange rate
and provides an incentive to speculate against the currency.22
From a theoretical point of view we expect a negative relation between
the amount of foreign exchange reserves and the probability of a currency
crisis.
{ DFOREXi









t are the Foreign Exchange Reserves (IFS line 1D).
21Published by J.P. Morgan Chase & Co. under www.jpmorgan.com.
22This is explained also in ¯rst generation models like Krugman (1979) or Flood and Garber
(1984) and in second generation models like Obstfeld (1994).
18² Deposit Rate (-)
According to interest rate parity a growing deposit rate will lead to an
appreciation of the currency. Therefore we expect a negative relationship
between deposit rate and currency crisis.
{ DEPOSIT i
t = Deposit Rate (IFS line 60L)
² Exports (-)
The role of exports is twofold and relates to the development of the for-
eign exchange reserves as well as to the production volume of the domestic
economy.
First, higher exports (capital import, respectively) will increase the for-
eign exchange reserves. The expected impact of this e®ect is negative.
Second, growing exports may indicate growing national income.23 The lat-
ter may raise the attractiveness for foreign investments and induce capital
in°ows. This implies a negative e®ect, too.
{ DEXUSi















if the exports are denominated in national currency, and
EXUSi
t = EXPORT i
t otherwise
where EXPORT i
t is the export value (IFS line 70).
² Consumer Price Index (+)
According to purchasing power parity, a growing CPI should lead to a
declining exchange rate. Keeping the exchange rate level ¯xed leads to a
loss of foreign exchange reserves and to a higher crisis probability.
Beside this fact there is also an output e®ect. In°ation along with a ¯xed
exchange rate makes domestic goods more expensive abroad. The national
economy looses competitiveness and the government might be forced to
devaluate the currency.24
{ DCONPRIi









t is the Consumer Price Index (IFS line 64).
23See ISXM-equation.
24Obstfeld (1994) develops a second generation crisis model where missing an output target
leads to a self-ful¯lling prophecy and, hence, to a crisis.
193.4.3 The Contagion Indicator
Our contagion indicator is aimed to represent a factor causing crises which
can not or not fully be explained by macro variables as considered above: the
contagion e®ect. Our theoretical reasoning in section 2 suggests that given two
countries i and j the crisis probability for country i is the higher, the higher
the losses of an investor in country j are. For simplicity we assume that the
investment losses in country j can be described simply by the exchange rate
losses.
Our de¯nition of the contagion indicator is based on this line of arguments.
The contagion indicator for country i has to re°ect the exchange rate losses of
the international investor in all the other countries of our sample. We assume
that a loss of 15% in a particular country is high enough to induce the investor
to change his portfolio. The more neighboring countries cause losses for the
investor, the higher the signal of our contagion indicator will be. Admittedly,
this is a simple approach to build a contagion indicator. But since this 15%
threshold substantially di®ers from the country-speci¯c thresholds computed to
de¯ne a crisis25 the contagion indicator does not simply mimic the summation
of the crisis variable. Hence, our contagion indicator is computed as follows:
² Contagion Indicator (+)
The indicator aggregates the number of neighboring countries su®ering
substantial exchange rate devaluations. Hence, we expect a positive rela-
tion to the crisis probability.
{ Cont15i




























3.5 Estimation and Empirical Results
Our ¯rst regression is build on the six macro indicators considered above, ex-
cluding the contagion indicator. The result is given in table 1. All coe±cients
are signi¯cant and have the expected signs.
25The threshold for e.g. Korea is 38%, for Indonesia is 114% and for Thailand is 32%.
20Indicator Regression Coe®. Coe®./S.E. P-Value
DFOREX -,057 -3,460 0,00
DJPMREX -,277 -6,991 0,00
DEXUS -,099 -4,211 0,00
DCONPRI ,175 2,513 0,01
M2MULTI ,238 1,938 0,05
DEPOSIT -,274 -2,687 0,01
INTERCEPT -3,938 -3,902 0,00
-2Log-Likelihood 106,966
Nagelkerkes R2 0,809
Cox & Snell R2 0,362
Chi-Square 334,077 DF = 6 P-Value = 0,00
Pearson Goodness-of-Fit Â2 = 279,074 DF = 737 P-Value = 1,00
Table 1: Results of regression 126
The classi¯cation table (table 2) shows the hits and misses of this regression
using a threshold value of 0.50.27 Accordingly, 98% of the non-crisis events and
80% of the crisis events are predicted properly by our regression equation.
predicted predicted correct result
0 1 in %
observed
0 671 8 98,8%
observed
1 13 52 80,0%
total
percentage 97,2%
Table 2: Hits and misses for regression 1
The light-gray bands in the ¯gures 8 to 13 represent the predicted probabilities
from the ¯rst regression without the contagion indicator in comparison with
our crisis variable (pictured by the white band). As we can see the results
for Singapore and the Philippines are not satisfactory. This suggests to ask
whether the crises as observed for Singapore and the Philippines are the results
of contagion rather than of macro fundamentals. This question is answered by
the next regression including the contagion indicator.
The result from the regression with the contagion indicator (table 3) is as
follows: the coe±cients of the macro fundamentals have the expected signs.
The coe±cient of the contagion indicator CONT15 is highly signi¯cant with
the expected sign. Admittedly, w.r.t. the P-Values, the coe±cient for DEXUS
is signi¯cant on a 10% level and DFOREX misses this level marginally.
26Note that the Null-Hypothesis for the Chi-Square test is H0: Coe±cients = 0 and for the
Pearson Goodness-of-Fit test H0: observed and estimated distributions are equal.
27See e.g. Esquivel and Larrain (1998), p.34.
21Indicator Regression Coe®. Coe®./S.E. P-Value
DFOREX -,058 -1,582 0,11
DJPMREX -,396 -2,939 0,00
DEXUS -,041 -1,632 0,10
DCONPRI ,768 2,696 0,01
M2MULTI ,585 1,983 0,05
DEPOSIT -1,143 -2,587 0,01
CONT15 2,976 3,271 0,00
INTERCEPT -13,629 -3,192 0,00
-2Log-Likelihood 39,346
Nagelkerkes R2 0,933
Cox & Snell R2 0,417
Chi-Square 401,697 DF = 7 P-Value = 0,00
Pearson Goodness-of-Fit Â2 = 46,965 DF = 736 P-Value = 1,00
Table 3: Results of regression 228
Comparing the classi¯cation tables with and without contagion indicator (tab.2
and tab.4) it is obvious that the number of hits is considerably larger for the
second regression than for the ¯rst one.
predicted predicted correct result
0 1 in %
observed
0 674 5 99,3%
observed
1 2 63 96,9%
total
percentage 99,1%
Table 4: Hits and misses for regression 2
Comparing the predicted probabilities of the two regressions (¯gures 8 to 13,
where the dark-gray bands represent the results of regression 2) we note that
for Singapore and the Philippines the predicted probabilities ¯t better the de-
pendent crisis variable while the results for the other countries ¯t as good as in
the ¯rst regression or slightly better. This result con¯rms the argument that
contagion did matter in the Asian crisis.
3.6 Summary of the regression results
As we can see from the predicted probabilities, the variables in regression 1 are
suitable to explain the crises in Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand and Korea. The
results for Singapore and the Philippines led to the suspicion that contagion ef-
fects have caused these crises. This was con¯rmed by introducing the contagion
variable.
We conclude that the crises in Singapore and the Philippines are not driven
28Note that the Null-Hypothesis for the Chi-Square test is H0: Coe±cients = 0 and for the
Pearson Goodness-of-Fit test H0: observed and estimated distribution are equal.
22merely by the development of the economic fundamentals. They are (at least
partly) triggered by contagion e®ects.
In the case of the Philippines this result is in line with the ¯ndings of e.g. Berg
and Pattillo (2000). They point out that this crisis can not be explained suf-
¯ciently by standard macro variables. The results for Singapore are supported
by e.g. Masson (1998) who identi¯es "obvious signs" for contagion e®ects in
this country.
4 Summary
This paper investigates contagion e®ects in the case of the Asian crisis. Fol-
lowing Masson (1998, p.3) the de¯nition of contagion is a crisis triggered "...for
reasons unexplained by economic fundamentals..."
Following the theoretical part of this paper, contagion e®ects can be triggered
by portfolio losses originated from a crisis in another country. Herding behavior
of the lowly informed investor reinforces this e®ect and may thereby cause a
currency crisis.
With respect to the theoretical examinations we construct a contagion indi-
cator. Using this indicator the empirical research in the second part of the
paper suggests that the crises in Singapore and the Philippines are (at least
partly) caused by contagion e®ects. In these cases the predicted probabilities
for the occurrence of a crisis were noticeable lower without using the contagion
indicator.
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A Graphical Representation
Figures 2 to 7 show the growth rates of the exchange rate for each country
(national currency per US-Dollar). The period of time is January 1990 till
April 2000. The gray horizontal line is the respective threshold value for each
country. Above this threshold level the crisis variable Crisisi
t is 1, and 0
otherwise.
The Figures 8 to 13 show the time paths of our crisis variable Crisisi
t and the
estimated crisis probabilities resulting from the two regressions. The white
band describes the crisis variable (per de¯nition with the value 0 or 1), the dark
gray band depicts the results from the regression with the contagion indicator
while the light gray band shows the results from the regression without the
contagion indicator. The period shown covers the "crisis relevant" time horizon





























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 13: Regression results for Thailand
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